On several occasions, Michel de Certeau has put forward a structural analogy between believing and seeing. Both the act of believing as well as the act of seeing, he claims, are extremely complex stratified practices, expressions, and outcomes of highly articulated life forms. They are a mix of giving and taking, an asymmetrical dynamic exchange of assets and debits wherein a subject takes shape and adopts a position in the world. The difference is that in the case of believing, the relationship between subject and object is deeply affected by time and is necessarily set within an external social temporization. This eventually makes it a temporal practice and, I would say, an alienated practice of difference. In the case of seeing, de Certeau claims, the temporization relates to a register of expectations and anticipations as much as the sensorial ways of achieving visual perception. This disparity will bring us to the debate on issues of beholding as made visible by postwar neo-avant-garde artists, and more specifically Yves Klein.

De Certeau alludes to the notion of Urglaube or Urdoxa, taken from Husserl’s Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, which is central in Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished The Visible and the Invisible. It regards an original belief in the perceptual presence of the world, the belief that the real experience of living in the world bodily is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “older than any opinion.” An intuition like this is the genetic moment preceding every thematization of the world as object of thought and knowledge: It is belief in and not knowledge about this world. It is, in fact, immanent and embodied in every act of perception, as performed by the simple and natural man as well as by the philosopher and phenomenologist (or, in reference to the artworld, by the amateur beholder as well as by the critic). Not by chance is such natural evidence of the world nowadays assumed by neurophenomenology with regard to a naturalization of intentionality and logical intersubjectivity founded on embodied simulation. Whereas for de Certeau belief in seeing involves a social and pragmatic contextual dimension (perhaps—I would take the liberty to suggest—it even involves an institutional one in the case of the artworld), this dimension is completely lacking in the sensorial belief in the evidence of the lifeworld, of the Lebenswelt and its bodily, empathetic, and intersubjective foundation.

I would like to dwell precisely on this difference between believing and seeing and, more particularly, on this temporalization of the space of the appearance of the Other in general, whether this be world or event, thing, artifact, artwork, or institution. To interrogate the role played by time in practices of believing as opposed to those of seeing, as de Certeau invites us to do, means interrogating the destiny and status of the place, or local support, and material of the aesthetic and sensible manifestation of the Other. Does it have just a function or is it a real substance? What matter is such a place or support made of and how is it possible that there is a commutation of the presence of the Thing and a transformation of its appearance by a faculty that is completely detached from the dominion of the senses—or that, at any rate, is claimed as such? Such ability is
strictly reserved for the work of the imagination and of the imaginary, and therefore is always in the future and eventually is utopian or unreal, while such conversion is founded on the principle of esse est percipi, a principle which may be assigned to an experience called “aesthetic,” that is to say that it touches the senses, and is aesthesiological and bodily, perceptual or sensorial, and eventually factual. Is this not exactly what happens in certain experiences of art after modernism in which the work and the support itself are put into question by a complex absconding logic? How can one describe an objectless aesthetic experience in light of the believing/seeing polarity? What happens to the praxis and idea of art when belief is withdrawn from the visible dimensions of the artifacts and objects? How can this dialectic between believing and feeling and between seeing and feeling be articulated into a post-beholding frame, and what bearing can it have on aesthetics and on the practices of art, on the criticism or philosophy of art, and on the artwork?

These queries, in my view, lead to posing the problem of a poiesis, a “making,” and an immaterial aesthetic of the artifact and the artwork. With Yves Klein as a precocious instantiation, it means defining some element for a genealogy of art after modernism (more strictly after conceptual art and minimalism) and some premise for a philosophy of art that does not reject anthropological and phenomenological relevancies or the analysis of the institutions of the artworld.

1. A relational chiasma

A statement made by Jean-Michel Rey may introduce us to the discussion of these and other questions. The artwork, he writes, “to the extent that it does not have a purpose, is capable of influencing—and transforming—those who engage with it, those who use it. It does not promise anything: anything other than the itself that is to come, anything other than the itself that is to be born over and over again.” In short, the artwork only offers itself on the strength of the promise (a sort of “credit”) that it is capable of inciting among its possible recipients. The artwork is an illocutionary gesture and a performative act, it is a taking up of body analogous to the taking up of word with respect to langue, a bringing into shape, or more exactly a rhetorical figure-making, which, in fact, is directed towards the Other—the beholder, reader, listener, public, Man—as subject of a “believing-to-know” how to see, read, listen, feel, and so forth. The articulation between “knowledge” and “co-birth,” between connaissance and co-naissance, proposed by Paul Claudel in 1907 and so much loved by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Henri Maldiney, illustrates this credit relationship between the work to come, announced and virtual, and the possible yet unknown subjects capable of paying attention to it, and of completing it through their acceptance. Such a relationship is also valid when the looming arrival of the possible thing is empathetically mimed and its imminence is bodily emulated, in accordance with the emotional logic of the as if, whose functioning and relevance in the experience of art are illustrated in the rhetoric of the sublime as well as by the psychologies of the Einfühlung and neuroaesthetics after Damasio.

Attention is in fact two-directional: It goes from the recipient to the work and back again, from the Thing to the Other and back again, and is possible only thanks to a kind of apriori faith in the aesthetic experience.

In “The Task of the Translator,” the essay written in 1921 at the introduction of his translation of Baudelaire’s Parisian Pictures, Walter Benjamin broadly identifies the anthropological dimension of this dynamic. Contrary to any theory of reception aesthetics, Benjamin states that the not-yet-realized work is directed towards man as such. The attention [die Aufmerksamkeit] paid by a certain or ideal public is completely ignored in its historical and psychological elements or in its normative and exemplary ones. It is the existence and essence of Man in general—that is Dasein and Wesen des Menschen überhaupt—that is addressed by the form of possible life of a thing, which is not only Kunstwerk but Kunstform and hence goes beyond the domain of the artistic manufact stricto sensu, which is not an object with intrinsic physical properties and secondary aesthetic qualities. It is Man in general who is called upon to be born together with a Thing, which is exhibited but


in absence. It is therefore human attention as such, undetermined and devoid of contents, that is to be incited by a Thing, which is proposed, but as an instance, which announces itself, but is still to come.

It is a matter of a form of reciprocal expectancy of the Other, delineating a chiasm between Man and Thing. They exist one for the other and one without the other. The latter is presented in the form of inattentiveness, indifference, even negligence and lack of concern with regard to its strictly aesthetic reception and the fruition limited to the artistic object, artifact, or artwork, or to its material and real material support. And this desingularization of the Other as überhaupt man is accompanied by a parenthesizing of the singularity of the material forms, of the überhaupt Thing—Man, the Thing: the one without the other. The Thing in question and still to come activates a suspension by itself precisely inasmuch as it is itself, as a Kunstform in general, in search of the aesthetic relationship with the Other—Man in general—who will eventually ascribe sense to it and will realize it. Man, Thing: not two substances already given and consolidated, but two possible and imminent existences and essences, the one suspended on the promise of the other.

This ontological chiasm is also rhetorical: Does it have anything to do with something akin to Baroque nonchalance or to ironic indifference or to the sublime’s ars celat artem? Or is it all about an expiation? A sacrifice? Something like a giving sign—from the Thing to Man and vice versa—which hides itself as such, which neither does nor pretends to make a rhetorical figure or to figure anything. Such figure may be, as Quintilian and Aristotle claim about metaphor and trope, something like the substance. Or it may be something like a making-facingness (to evoke Michael Fried and Meyer Shapiro), but which disfigures the frontality and gives and receives the “thou,” diverting every injunction that frontally addresses the Other.

2. Things of credit

Let us then try to examine attention in general—paid or otherwise to the überhaupt man by the Thing, whether this be a manufactured article or an everyday object, event, or artwork. In paragraph 109 of the first book of The Man without Qualities, but also in a writing of the Posthumous Papers of a Living Author, we read about daily manufacts als Schuldnerdinge, as things of credit, through which an individual or a collective subject believes it can be recognized and referred to without limitation. There, Robert Musil analyzes clothes and fashion as an embodiment of what is nonexistent and invisible, impalpable and incorporeal: As an embodiment of values and qualities beyond the senses, which nevertheless are immediately manifested and instantly attract attention. A garment, but also any banal object, figures or makes a figure for someone, gives him a signal, brings not physical or visual properties to his gaze but the unseen, das Unsichtbare: That is to say, the operations themselves are the institution of their meaning, and present the conditions of possibility of their value and their invisible agency. It is, as Ernst Cassirer called it, the dimension of the function and not of the substance.

Like others, Musil takes a morphological look at the expressive and physiognomic relationship between soul and clothing: Clothes are like the worldly skin of the psyche, they are “matter for live energy” (Bergson), modern inorganic supports wherein Pathosformel, even archaic ones, are embodied, this time in the sense of incarnation or being body, of Verkörperung and Verleibung. But here what counts, in my view, is neither the dimension of the hidden object, of the Heimlichkeit and the Übersehen, nor that of the allegory of the goods, from Freud to Benjamin, or the ideological dimension of what the late Husserl would have called Ideenkleid—a garb of ideas, a garment or abstract mental habitus, an idealational veil wrapped tightly around the body and around the world of life; here what is relevant is the surface dimension of the significiation inasmuch as Produktionskredit, insofar as production of credit. Thus we find ourselves within the dimension of the denotative semantic transfiguration of the ordinary object rather than the debate on Anerkennung and the perceptual invariant or


8. On the expressiveness of clothes as Pathosformeln, between Lavater and Warburg, between Simmel and Benjamin on Baudelaire, and Bergson—of which I here quote Le rire (1899)—I have dwelt in “Mondanità dell’antico,” in L’immagine rubata. Seduzioni e astuzie dell’ekphrasis, ed. A. Valtolina (Milan: Bruno Mondatori, 2007), pp. 65–89.

recognition of the sudden aspceptual change in keeping with the “Sehen-als” and the “Seeing-in,” between Wittgenstein and Wollheim and beyond.10

It appears to me, in fact, that Musil is also pointing out that, detached from the space of conventional use and from its normal perceptual and cognitive context, an ordinary object may become a site of transmutation of habitual recognition, and may become a place in which there emerge—in the Nietzschean sense of Entstehung (material, impure, and contingent beginning, as opposed to Ursprung, single abstract and nontemporal origin) and not of aesthetic Relevance or highly debated aesthetic supervenience11—not strictly aspceptual properties (attributes of its substance) or deep significances (effects of the plasticity of the sense and of the figurability of the unconscious), but of fiduciary semantic operations, and also contextual ones, which postulate properties and functions, and eventually the values of the manifestation of sense as such, and of its experience. Every ordinary object makes a real figure, becomes a place of production of perceptible, emotional, and cognitive effects, a real concrete place, a thing that realizes and embodies art.

Might this aesthetic difference be said to be more an effect of a fiduciary rhetoric than a transfiguration of the banal, based, as Arthur Danto would have it, only on the visual metaphor?12 Can it be maintained that making a figure means making believe and creating credit? How then can the difference between believing and seeing not be articulated as this difference between morphology and function, as it was from Duchamp to Kosuth, but as an imperceptibility of function and not of form and substance between an object of aesthetic experience and an object of ordinary use?

3. Attention, interlocution

A work of art that does not yet exist, a possible thing, is not therefore addressed to a definite recipient but engages the Other, the other man as ein Gegenüber, as interlocutor. Paul Celan tells us of this indefinite waiting on the part of the poem-to-come for the eventuality that Another might approach it and, in his turn, take note, of this chiasm of virtual inattentive attention devoid of any object or direction. In The Meridian, the poet too recalls Benjamin and quotes Malebranche’s expression reported in the essay on Kafka: “Attentiveness is the natural prayer of the soul.”13 The poem about to be made is attentive to all that may happen, to the possible inasmuch as being such, and therefore to Man in general as interlocutor. For Celan, in a word, it regards “the attentiveness that the poem tries to devote to all it encounters.”14 What is involved is not a good and correct “use of the senses,” a Wahrnehmung, nor just a capacity to note something perceptible—at a glance, a perceptive and aspceptual attention to something hidden—but a motiveless waiting for the arrival of something indefinite and undetermined, devoid of any properties, the appearance of the thing, and of the human in general.

In a previous manuscript version of The Meridian, the Malebranche quotation is corrupt and we read that attention is “awaited,” it is Frömmigkeit in the religious sense of compassion and faith: “Aufmerksamkeit ist das natürliche Frömmigkeit der Seele.”15 An eloquent slip: Attention-waiting is a believing, which, however, goes beyond perceptual belief in the phenomenon and in the


world of life, which does not believe in seeing and in sensibility but in their condition of possibility. “To pray is to be attentive,” Simone Weil had said, and indeed it would be interesting to discuss how, in an opposite and complementary way to Celan, for example, in the “Reflections on the Right Use of Scholarly Studies with a View to the Love of God,” she reformulates Platonism as well as phenomenology in an original manner, articulating the antinaturalism of the contemplative distance introduced by the epoché and the natural and creational sentiment of love towards the beautiful, as natural as it is artistic.16

Celan deliberately uses the metaphor of the handshake between two men to speak of the realization of this attention-waiting, of this belief in the event: Mitwisserschaft or Miterscheinung, endowment, complicity, or co-appearing between the thing that is about to be and the one who approaches it, a handshake is a poietic or performative act in which the Thing and the Other are reciprocally made, albeit each remaining singular and unyielding. And, we may add, along with de Certeau, this gestural chiasm between two bodies in space, this mitgegen in which two possible bodies meet and are never finally fully realized, is specifically an act of believing, since it temporalizes the space of the relationship with the Other. The singularity of the possible meeting between poem and world, between Thing and Man is, as Celan in fact writes, a precise and unique presence in which the Other’s time, which can never be appropriate, is realized.17 Here, Verkörperung, as a formalistic and abstract meaning embodiment, beyond a cultural and encyclopedic one, the hetero-affection of the corporeal gesture, realizes and embodies, without consuming it, the performative characteristic of the act of belief, as de Certeau keeps telling us: The reciprocal attentive concentration of the Thing and the Other, of the poem and of Man, is never permanently fulfilled and is always possible.

4. Poietic gestures

Made without being consumed by the Other—is this the artwork? Is it the Thing? Are we dealing with what may be called, following Mallarmé, the poetic and rhetorical logic of the summa, of the incalculable (testimonial) of the beyond of every sum, of the excess of every totality and figure? A sumptuous gesture, offering prestige and luxury of an always possible, perpetually imminent credit? Is it, in short, a question of the logic of the sublime or of sacrifice, perhaps of expiation?

We appear to be dealing with a gesture—like a handshake between two unknown people—which creates the elements without creating, which brings the Thing—an artwork—and Man in general into a relationship of a poietic gesture; thus, creative only of the possible occasion of singular and reciprocal attention, productive only of the virtual contingency of a credit exchanged with the Other. It is an action which, on the one hand, frees itself from the perceptive belief in the world, loosens itself from all sense, from beholding, seeing, and touching, from every image and perception of image,18 figure, and material, and finally detaches itself from every artwork, object, or support. On the other hand, it is an act that creates a belief in sensibility understood above all as a dominion of the

what appears. Who questions this appearing and addresses it. It becomes dialogue—it is often despairing dialogue. Only in the realm of this dialogue does that which is addressed take form and gather around the I who is addressing and naming it. But the one who has been addressed and the one who, by virtue of having been named, has, as it were, become a thou, also brings its otherness along into the present, into this present.—In the here and now of the poem it is still possible—the poem itself, after all, has only this one, unique, limited present—only in this immediacy and proximity does it allow the most idiosyncratic quality of the Other, its time, to participate in the dialogue.”

16. S. Weil, “Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God,” in Waiting on God, trans. E. Crauford (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1951), pp. 111–114—see “Réflexion sur le bon usage des études scolaires en vue de l’Amour de Dieu,” in Attente de Dieu (Paris: Colombe, 1950—but see Fayard, 1966, pp. 72–75): Attention “consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready to be penetrated by the object; it means holding in our minds, within reach of this thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should be in relation to all particular and already formulated thoughts, as a man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains. Above all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its naked truth the object that is to penetrate it. [. . .] This gaze is first an attentive gaze, where the soul empties itself of all its own content in order to receive in itself the being who it looks at as he is, in all his truth. This can only be done by those capable of attention.”

receptivity of the senses, not as a sphere of feelings—for the Thing and a belief in the Other, in Man in general as capable of being affected by it, of living it and finally of appreciating it. Belief in sensibility institutes a belief in the things, places, and times of a world separate from the lifeworld, a heterotopia, an antiworld or other world—one in an exceptional state. Is it, then, in the artwork that one can describe the articulation of a belief that exhibits the nonreality of its object as Thing and, at the same time, is instituted and even institutionalized, and as such hidden or elided?

Although it is de Certeau yet again who allows us to infer that this gestural performance regards space, for the moment it is sufficient to say that we are in a case opposite to that of Celan, for whom the meeting in space between two bodies affirmed the exact and reciprocally inappropriate presence of the Other’s time: of the time of the Thing or poem, and of that of the other individual. For de Certeau, it is a matter of an indefinite place and a meeting between anonymous bodies or nonidentities: Now, by this locating agency, the place spatializes the time of the relationship—it, too, is one of nonappropriation, with the Other—between the Thing and the generic and plural man.

The aesthetic act, even understood as the modulation of the Thing into a frame of perceptibility, is an act of belief instructed by a rhetoric of aesthesiological access reduction, perceptual bodily life subtraction, and ontological and relational nature ellipsis. There is nothing to be seen, neither images nor figures, hence no aspectual perception, nor any signs of aspectual attention susceptible of being interpreted. And yet, it is necessary that there be the Thing, Work, and Art. There is nothing real and perceptible, and yet it is as if there were something to be felt, seen, touched, appreciated, valued, and interpreted. It is as if: It is a question of a conceding device of possibility, namely the possibility of imaginary values and aesthetic and artistic properties, of an operator, at the same time both fictional and institutional, of relationships and experiences.

If there is something like a non-artwork, like a non-thing, like a non-artifact, which, paradoxically, performs a very special manner of showing and exemplifying art and, to be more exact, of epitomizing the instance and necessity of what Thierry de Duve has defined as “art in general” or in the generic sense of the term,

this operation may be said to regard a certain type of believing, which is a practice of believing and credit, a relationship of trust. Why? Because in my view it seems that it has to do with a designation, even a presentation (in the sense, with Wittgenstein, of Darstellung) of an evacuation and a suspension of the properties of perception of the manifestation of the Thing or of the work, which, on its own part confounds the attention that it still requires and assumes from the Other—Man in general, to whom it is destined—and thus denounces, perhaps reluctantly, the fragility of the change of sense, experience, and comprehension, which it meant to activate towards its beholder.

Aesthetic credit seems, however, to extend beyond the singularity of the pragmatic context of the relationship and appears to affect the human in general, putting his ground and history in jeopardy. Here, we may turn to Klein’s meditations on the realm of the sensible, articulated in *Overcoming the Problematics of Art* (1959). Klein did not exhibit a tangible object or artifact at this group exhibition at Antwerp but proposed a theory of sensibility and an immaterial artwork, which he declared would be exchanged for an ingot of gold at the vernissage.20

Let me note, first, the theoretical and conceptual role of self-adulatory irony, mixed with a certain prolixity, anger, and elliptical mystification with regard to the artwork. I am also impressed by the constant programmatic strategy of pre- or antedating, which disrupts the sense of the genesis and history of the arguments, and above all surreptitiously establishes an affiliation and a genealogy, in short, a mythology of the artist’s own invention. Note, for example, the strange function of suspending authenticity effected by the time markers, both at the level of discourse and narrative and exchange-value is general. Thus he posed as an artist and exhibited the void. What could be more general? He played the card of art’s social ritual in the context of a commercial gallery where ordinarily what gets exchanged is painting for money, specific aesthetic value for a general equivalent. He still had to establish that exchange actually barters the specific against the general.” Th. de Duve, “Yves Klein, or The Dead Dealer,” *October* 49 (Summer 1989):87–89. See also “La nouvelle donne. Remarques sur quelques qualifications du mot ‘art,’’ *Figures de l’Art* 10 (2006):83–98.

20. Y. Klein, “Le dépassement de la problématique de l’art” (published on December 1959 and presented on the occasion of the collective exhibition “Vision in Motion” at Antwerp, Hessenhuis, inaugurated on March 17, 1959, and partially taken up by the more celebrated Conférence à la Sorbonne on June 1959; see note 3), pp. 80–81, translated by K. Ottmann as “Overcoming the Problematics of Art,” in *Overcoming the Problematics of Art* (see note 3), pp. 45–46.
of the historic past and onirical imperfect, employed in conjunction with the first person as a marker in place of an autobiographical fictionalization. 

Or, the suspension of authenticity evidenced in conjunction with a self-legitimizing homage to and parodistic creolization of the languages of Spanish and Italian painting, of Vélasquez and Titian. Elsewhere, one will think of the appropriation of entire sets of knowledge by metonymy, as well as practices and poetics, thanks to the function-emblem of the very names of Delacroix, Bachelard, and Huyghe or Artaud. From “Quelques extraits de mon Journal en 1957,” maybe one of the first writings of an artist who will eventually proclaim himself as “the authentic realist of the beautiful today” and will sign himself as Yves Klein le Monochrome.21 I quote a particularly eloquent statement of this fiduciary rhetoric: “Credit was given to me. The gesture alone was enough. The public had accepted the abstract intention.”

In Klein’s discourse we are face to face with a strategy of indirect self-commemoration and anticipated self-monumentalization, emphasized by absence of doing on the part of the artist and by unproductiveness of any use of the senses on the part of the beholder: “I observe”—we read in a note of 1955—“that it is possible to find pleasure in pride as well. I think that I am a great genius, however, I do not produce anything sensational.”22

5. Spaces of believing

Klein speaks of an attention paid to the Other, to an impersonal and generic Spectatorship, to someone anonymous and unknown who is believed to be capable of inferring, accepting, feeling, and incorporating understanding, and finally realizing what is signaling to his awareness as artist-beholder. But this attention is not only instituted by an initial trust. It is no longer regards emerging aspects of any daily objects or events. The attention of which Klein speaks is no longer claimed either by any visible details—as in Musil—or by any singular moments—as in Celan—but by space in general, without depictions or representations, without figures or images. It is atmosphere23 both in the sense of Stimmung (emotional tonality), as well as Atmosphäre (surrounding environment). An engaging air, which addresses someone who will first catalyze with an indexing gesture the immaterial that makes it an awesome sign and then will return it to the others at the same time as general and as site-specific but without hypostasizing it in an image, figure, or object, without embodying it in phenomenological properties and sensible determinations, without mediating it in a material medium or in a physical support, whether it be artistic, or ordinary—like clothes for Musil or for Joseph Beuys and for so many others after the nominalistic embodiment of the readymade.

Better than “Yves—Le Monochrome,” the exhibition at the Galerie Collette Allendy in Paris on February–March 1956, “The Specialization of Sensibility in the Raw Material State into Stabilized Pictorial Sensibility” (“La Spécialisation de la sensibilité à l’état matière première en sensibilité picturale stabilisée”), known as “The Void” (“l’Exposition du Vide”) and originally titled “Monochrome Exacerbations,” was held at the Galerie Iris Clert in Paris (April 28–May 12, 1958). One may also think of the “Immaterieller Raum,” the empty room for the retrospective Monochrome und Feuer at the Haus Lange Museum in Krefeld (January 14–February 26, 1961). On the one hand, empty space is exposed and attracts towards itself; it acts, then, as a rigorously aniconic catalyst, or, in other words, as a vehicular medium24 of aspectual attention and cognitive revisions of perceptual habits and of historically determined aesthetic satisfactions. And yet, by itself, empty space seems to be inadequate as an effective cause for a real existential and epistemic transformation. Must the absent thing, the absolute Thing, be spatialized, circumscribed, and delimited by the exhibition site? Does the experience of the Thing appear to have to be eventually realized through an external element? Does it appear to need a specific site, a fixed institutional context of the art world?25 The Duchampian infra-mince

21. Y. Klein, “Quelques extraits de mon Journal en 1957” (1957?), in Le dépassement de la problématique de l’art (see note 3), p. 47. In the isomorphism of proper noun, real name, and generic name is stated all the superficiality and the semantic indeterminateness/vagueness of the fiduciary designation of the “Ceci est de l’art,” as Thierry de Duve has shown in his works on readymade and post-Duchampian art, esp. Résonances du Readymade, Duchamp entre avant-garde et tradition (Nîmes: Jacqueline Chambon, 1989).
22. Ibid., p. 333.
25. Indeed, in a post-scriptum to the Règles rituelles de la cession des zones de sensibilité picturale immatérielle (1957–1959), Klein points out that, beyond every rule and ritual convention, “there exist [. . .] certain concessions-transfers of the void and immaterial in the
is embodied, on the one hand, in the apparently static magnetism of the atmosphere and in the active attitudes or aesthetic and mental behavior towards the Other, towards the beholder in general. On the other hand, it is one pole of a partial dynamic attraction, and of an immanently defective aesthetic satisfaction, which can be reached through a singular device that locates the occult and indexicalizes the hidden claim for attention. It is a spatial device characteristic of the social practices of believing described by de Certeau: The nonsensible causal properties, including the artist’s intentions, are finally embedded and settled in a support-site. The oversensible and tangible is presented without the mediation of perceptual objects and properties, yet it must be given form by an accredited, even functional, institutional container.

The immaterial realizes its efficacy and agency among those whom Klein calls “spectateurs-viveurs,” among the recipients necessary for its existence: The Thing meets with and is realized through the Other thanks to a belief, which is equally necessary in art in general in its capacity to incite aesthetic forms of behavior beyond the perceptive faith in the world of the senses. It is not by chance that we constantly find a metaphoric mystical language in Klein: impregnation, absorption, absorption, absorption.

Figure 1. Le Vide, interior view of Yves Klein exhibition at Galerie Iris Clert, April 28–May 13, 1958; Empty vitrine. Courtesy of the Yves Klein Archives, Paris.


27. For instance, _Job_ 38, 9: “et hemène de autēi nephos amphiasin, homichlēi de autēn esparganôsa” “cum ponerem nubem vestimentum eius et caligine illud quasi pannis infantiae obvolverem,” “When I made the cloud the garment thereof, and thick darkness a swaddling cloth for it.” Claudel was to write that “immédiatement nous sommes dedans [la peinture], nous l’habitons, [n]ous sommes pris, [n]ous sommes contenus par elle, nous nous en ressentons la forme sur nous comme un vêtement, [n]ous y trempons par tous les pores, par toutes
atmospheric wrapping. He uses analogies in which anatomy, tailoring, architecture, physiology, and meteorology are interwoven, and that speak of the mix between aesthesiology and aesthetics. But today it must be said at the outset that such a metaphor transports, perhaps reluctantly, a surreptitious museum-type set, and is functional, perhaps inadvertently, of a strategy of fictionalization of aesthesiological and empathetic embodiment, in what might be called a theory of meaning embodiment, and ends up by cancelling out the materiality of the embodiment in the sense of Verkörperung and Verleibung. Such a theory must therefore be discussed also with regard to the basic lexis of contemporary aesthetics—especially by Arthur Danto and by the institutional theories and the aesthetic attitudes towards the debate on aesthetical properties, also in assumed humanistic cognitive science, and so on.

How is this transmission of the invisible to be understood, when it is molded on our body and envelops it? Let us question Klein's metaphor, assuming it in terms that are both anthropological and mediological: How is this transmission through contact to be understood, this Kommunikativ Atmosphäre (Gernot Böhme), whereby the form is a physiognomic and expressive attribute but also a necessary and adequate one for the substance of the beholders? How are we to describe the articulation from the aesthesiological to the aesthetic and to the artistic? And, together with William Pietz and de Certeau, can we ask if it is perhaps a matter of a fetishism without embodiment, beyond the “untranscended materiality” and historicity of the object-support, which nevertheless activates an individual and community economy of time, perhaps a collective one, made up of dererments and transfers?

In “A sketch and general outlines of the economic system of the blue revolution” (“Esquisse et grandes lignes du système économique de la révolution bleu”), Klein speaks of “the ever more elaborate richness of the spatial patrimony.” What does it mean to liquidate the monetary system, suppress every form of “fiduciary exchange,” and then set up a “barter system” (“système de troc”) based not on the masterpieces of the past, but only on the “real,” or on “the intrinsic value of matter, which essentially resides in the notion of quality”? Is it just a question of an economy of symbolic exchange or of a general economy? What are its rules and dynamics, figures, times, and places? What does it mean to say that the zones of immaterial sensibility, like the void of the Iris Clert Gallery, are akin to sensibility and imagination and, above all, money? Is this analogy a likeness of function or of substance? All three would be, says Klein in this writing, the immaterial medium, which fixes and

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28. Perhaps it is useful to remember climatic theories, from Abbé Du Bos to Hyppolite Taine, to have a clearer understanding of Klein's statement uttered on the occasion of the presentation of l'Exposition du Vide and the blue curacao cocktail that the visitors were given—“The blood of sensibility’s body is blue”—and also to bring back to physiology the abstract and pure vocation of the artist and of art and to reconsider physically and biologically his idea of “air” and “ambiance” as literally “real pictorial climate” (“climat pictural réel”) and “humidity in the air.” In the SXIV of the Second Part of Du Bos's Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture (1719), we read: “All along man’s life and while the spiritual soul stays united with the body, the character of our spirit [esprit] and our inclinations very much depend on the qualities of our blood that nourishes our organs, [qualities that] very much depend on the air that we breathe.”

29. “Phenomenal attributes of a work of art are demonstrably also by its primary means for manifesting evolving neural activity.” B. M. Stafford, “Romantic Systematics and the Genealogy of Thought: The

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incorporates “the only thing that does not belong to us within us: our LIFE.”

Finally, “what is sensibility?” we ask ourselves along with Klein. His reply implies a principle of generalized translation of certain paradigmatic experiences of the history of art and beholding—at the same time by the artist-beholder and by an external beholder. It touches on an authentic general economy of the inappropriable and goes beyond a real and proper ontology. “Human or Cosmic Sensibility” or “pure energy” are, in fact, equivalent terms, says Klein, to what Delacroix called “soul” (“âme”) and they indicate “that which exists beyond our being, but which nonetheless always belongs to us. Life itself does not belong to us; we can purchase it with sensibility. Sensibility is the currency of the universe, of space, of vast nature, which permits us to purchase some LIFE as a raw commodity.”

Gaston Bachelard’s anti-conscientiﬁst phenomenology teaches Klein that to imagine means to make oneself absent in a sense and nonexistent to what really is, that the imaginary subject is de-individualized and unrealized inasmuch as Ego. To present the unreal without images or pictures and representations means, therefore, to make the beholder imagine and believe that such a representation beyond every artistic artifact, that such an unreal Thing, superficial and intangible, without depths or hideouts, without perceptual apprehension, interpretation or psychology, is being as such, and is the Great Art of the Real, and is Life in itself as Art Absolu. The immaterial Thing is presented in a place as an invisible but present environmental event, the Thing unrealized and set by the imagination as intangible but sensible atmosphere, the achiropoietic Thing not made by Man is the medium, which realizes such an act of belief on the part of the Other.

6. Which atmosphere?

But let us ask ourselves: How is it possible to achieve not an aesthetic, active, perceptual, and cognitive relationship with an object, artifact, or artwork and its substantial or accessory aesthetic properties (even if only designated as such), but a perception-assimilation, a sensitive passive, emotional, and empathetic impregnation with the objectless Thing, with an atmosphere or an empty space, with the void or the unreal, with the afﬁrmation of life as such? How can we verify the truth content of a transmission by nonaesthetic contact with a space devoid of perceptible entities, images, and tangible objects and apart from meanings incarnated into iconographies and physical supports? What formalism, iconology, anthropology, and economy could help us to answer these questions?

The complex operation realized by the exhibition at Iris Clert in April 1958 involves a destabilization of the aesthetic taste and the normative order by the artist’s critics’ attitude towards the philosophy of (the world of) art; ﬁnally, it also has the valency of a demonstration. Dematerialized and pulverized, painting is the invisible work in the physical space of the gallery. It has already been “destroyed” by light in Caravaggio for Poussin and in Pollock for Kaprow, reduced to pigment and literally dropped to the ground by Duchamp and Man Ray, and later exhibited as an opaque device of museum semantics in the “dust sculptures” and at Staubbearbeiten of Erwin Wurm in the late 1980s, or recuperated in the two-dimensional atmosphere of abstraction according to Clement Greenberg. But at Iris Clert the Thing is present, is at work, and is in dispersed action in an environmental agency. It does not allow orientations, itineraries, views, or perspectives in space, but is a volumetric spatial impregnation, aesthesiological and felt but not perceptually elaborated. The Thing is the atmosphere, which surrounds the Other, the effective climate, which impregnates the beholder as Man in general.

James Elkins writes that “the body swells when it enters a wide hall,” and a recent study by Vittorio

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34. Y. Klein, “Le dépassement de la problématique de l’art” (see note 3), p. 84.
Gallese and the Sjoerd J. H. Ebisch group, supporting a productive dialogue between *Einfühlungstheorie*, phenomenology, and neurosciences, illustrates an embodied simulation activated by a perception, more exactly a sensation of an event in a space without any human agent and caused by an external nonbiological force. As in the case of l’Exposition du Vide, it is a state-event that literally touches from afar beyond the awareness of beholding and is inscribed and impressed in the physical supports of the “spectateurs-viveurs”: So, the beholders become fixing agents and living catalysts of the immaterial and its action and agency. It is very significant, in fact, for Klein that if the monochromes are the testimonies, which have seen what has happened, if they are like photographic plates physically impacted and modified by the real, this also goes for the living bodies of the beholders as support-viveurs of the “trace of immediacy” and of the “atmospheric printings.”

Klein speaks of the body of the beholders without insight as the “sensible vehicle” as Hans Belting would speak of the “medial body” [die Mediale Körper], and this physiological and biological medium is dialectic with the vehicular and abstract medium of aesthetic space.

While it would appear that a metaphorical function is favored in the Klein’s haptic rhetoric, I argue that it is a metonymic dimension that prevails and that it is, in fact, unequivocally affirmed by contact and indexicalization, economy of the imprint and the logic of the index, which is a theoretical symptom of the Thing’s plasticity and Klein’s vocation for sculpture, as well as, at a deeper level, of the Thing’s ontological realism and of its ingenuous phenomenology. However, such contact is also contagion in the sense of Frazer’s contagious magic (model updated by the neuro-*Einfühlungstheorie* too): The immaterial is incorporeal and powerful; it occurs through empathy and embodiment, and the Thing is realized by the Other, finally in the Other, by immanent difference and by contiguity, precisely as in a differential and metonymic logic of belief illustrated by de Certeau.

And yet it is expedient to make two annotations. The first: The site of the Iris Clert Gallery is a physical place and at the same time an institutional or overdetermined relational operator. It is a cognitive establishment, in terms of Danto and Dickie, which creates something like a theoretical as well as an emotional enthymeme, which primarily regards the belief and imaginary of the values of the artworld rather than the perception and the imagination of a strictly aesthetic experience. In short, the immateriality of the atmosphere and air—unless we imagine with Bachelard and Lucretius the invisible

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37. C. Del Gratta, S. J. H. Ebisch, V. Gallese, A. Ferretti, M. G. Perrucci, G.L. Romani, “The Sense of Touch: Embodied Simulation in a Visuotactile Mirroring Mechanism for Observed Animat or Inanimate Touch,” *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 20, no. 9 (August 2008): 1621: “Space around us is full of objects accidentally touching each other, that is, without any animate involvement. One could observe a pine cone falling on the garden bench in the park, or drips splashing on the leaves of a plant during a downpour. Models of embodied simulation posit that the same neural structures involved in our own body-related experiences contribute to the conceptualization of what we observe in the world around us. Extended to current results, simulation processes in a visuotactile mirroring mechanism may ground any perception of touch, and as such, contribute to the representation of an abstract, but prelinguistic, notion of touch.”


41. Further sign of a double-bind between belief and ontological realism, between immateriality and documentary, is, I think, the function of indexicality in the embodiment of the immaterial according to Klein, at the same time rigid (as proper nouns are for Saul Kripke or photographic transparency according to Kendall Walton and others), and without reifier or object.
ferment of the minuscule and life of dust, imperceptible to the naked eye—certifies what Danto, in his celebrated 1964 “The Artworld,” called “an atmosphere of theory,” which the physical eye cannot perceive, and unless we repeat, with Berkeley’s *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (Introduction: §3), that “we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.”

It seems to me, therefore, that the surface transparency of the medium affirms, in Klein, a semantic material opacity of art that is no longer a production—neither praxis nor techne, nor *Vorstellung*, since there are neither instruments, artifacts, nor representations endowed with aesthetic values. Rather, art becomes a demonstrative performance of situations with no perceivable entities or physical properties and yet accredited things to which one may give trust: Art, in short, capable of creating as much in the sense of *poiesis* and rhetorical *enargheia*, as of *Darstellung*—conceptual and cultural values, if not even philosophical attitudes.

Now I come to my second point. One could insist on certain operational and performative elements of Iris Clert’s *L’Exposition du Vide*. What function do the materials of the curtains between the rooms have and of those between the Galerie Clert and the street? And the empty window, taken up again by Wurm? It is all a question of a series of authentic frameworks of belief in an artistic context, of elements of a parergonal or parasitic dialectic within/without, shown/hidden, internal/external (remember the blue cocktail offered to the visitors), which also ends up investing the ontological dimension of the art/non-art borderlines and of physical and functional limits between ordinary or artistic and aesthetic object and also between aesthetic attention and tacit aesthetics. And one might easily speak of a rhetoric of presupposed elusion and of a liturgy of the implicit elision, or of an elliptical and conceptual self-reflexivity, perhaps in the sense of a theatricalization of concealment or perhaps of an ironic, minimal dissimulation—without *istoria*, without story or action, yet with a duration—a dramatization analogous to what Klein will say in November 1960 of the “theatre of the void” or “mono-théâtre”: It is all about a “theatre of operations of a certain conception of theatre” and of a “constant non-representation” (“constante areprésentation”). It is a dramatization or immaterial rhetoric complementary to the material rhetoric of the fetish Pietz discusses.

The artist shows all: That there is nothing to see, and he does it precisely by exhibiting an invisible entity, which does not conceal its essence or substance, yet which activates aesthetic attitudes and asks for aspirational attentions, and solicits appraisals, criticisms, sensible and intellectual reactions, and so on. The artist shows all: That there is nothing to see, and he does it exactly by presenting an immaterial entity that is believed capable of being able to move bodies and souls. The artist shows all: That there is nothing to see, and he does it exactly by allowing one to behold an unreal entity that is or becomes an object of that secularized belief which is the credibility or credulity of the artworld and of art in general. The artist shows all: That there is nothing to see, and he does it precisely by silently designing the Thing as “this is art” (“ceci est de l’art”) and as object of trust on the part of the Other as subject of an aesthetic relationship in the making. Here, too, we are faced with performative and differential relationships, in which the ontology of the artwork is dissimulated by the pseudo-artwork of the artistic context, and the perceptual dimension of the artifact is cancelled out by the pseudo-illustration of the artistic intentionality, by the so-called “believing to see.”

This circularity between event and belief and between experience and trust is evident and unthinkable without Duchampian nominalism. The aesthetic experience is the realization of a belief, which is its apriori aspect and alone makes it possible, describable, and definable. But this hermeneutical circularity confounds both

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the description and the definition of the Thing—the immaterial—that could be given by an internalist and externalist interpretation. By internalist interpretation, I mean, more or less in the vein of Danto’s and Gell’s views of agency, that which, in a formalist and realist perspective, claims that all the elements necessary for an aesthetic experience and for an adequate critical understanding belong to the work, either intrinsically or secondarily. By externalist interpretation, I mean that which in a historicist and pragmatic-conventionalist perspective claims that all that makes an object of everyday use or an artifact become a thing purposely destined for aesthetic contemplation does not belong and is external to it.

Now, there is a detail in the history of the material production of “L’Exposition du Vide,” which acts as a symptom of this fiduciary circularity, a probable avant-garde and modernist degradation of the liturgy of the aesthetic act. It is well known that Klein repainted the walls of the Clert gallery in white. The readymade’s conceptual maneuver is here connoted by the artisanal and artistic manufacture of painting—but Klein used a workman’s paint roller rather than a traditional brush—even perhaps by the gesture of the artist, at one and the same time destructive and intimate. In fact the gesture of the hand is twofold: On the one hand, it cancels the traces and the material debts still evident, despite everything, of artworks previously exhibited; so that this gesture of the painter’s hand seems to belong to the tradition of what Danto would call the “spectacular philosophical writing-off,” typical of the close of the 1950s. On the other hand, such a gesture brings about the conversion of gallery, a socially recognized public place, into the artist’s atelier, a closed private place.46

An iconology adhering to the tenets of internalism would welcome here a morphological approach: The atelier is the space occupied ex intra by the feelings, sensibility, and the life and thought of the artist—by the artist’s breath, one would say with an artistic alter-ego of Yves Klein, Piero Manzoni, or by the “interior sculpture” as Robert Smithson expressed it. It is the space molded from the inside and through contact, as if by natural involuntary secretion. It is, in short, a substantial form completely realized and adequate, just as the shell is for a snail and the body is for a man, a perfect work of the art of nature and a complete embodiment, integral and perfect, of Verkörperung or Verleibung.47 An iconology adhering to the tenets of externalism would see a highly complex logic of embodiment here: The artist’s idea or intention is embodied—indirectly and in a dissimulatory manner, maybe absconding, disguising, and disputing the readymade’s practice48—in an artwork, or some part of it, made by hand but using an industrially produced paint roller, in an artifact, therefore, but cancelled out in its materiality—“something totally immaterial, or rather, material but unconfirmed.”49

Finally, reference should be made to the basic yet unpredictable analyses, which Emile Benveniste consecrates to belief.50 An act of trust or faith, whether secularized or laicized, is not a figure of a theological credo, but an act of credit invested into a material or an immaterial good: promised words or riches, granted in exceptional circumstances. However, it is all a matter of an entrusting and a temporary loan to something or to someone, either mortal or divine, who/which is believed to be the holder of a magic force that is able to return it in accordance with a precise economy of the gift and counter-gift.

Benveniste gives a twofold and most instructive warning regarding what we are saying about Klein. On the one hand, the linguist admits that you cannot know which of our modern representations this notion of “magic force” may correspond to—that is, one believed capable of giving back what it received—and, on the other hand, he defines as a modern metaphor an etymology that establishes a interrelationship of this magic force, the object of belief, and the heart, understood as soul, spirit, or mind and not as the

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46. Y. Klein, “Conférence à la Sorbonne” (see note 3), p. 132.
47. The zoological analogy is used by Aristotle to define the substantial form in Phis. II, 192b 28–29, but soon becomes a
anatomic and physical organ, as the seat of the life force.\textsuperscript{51} So, I ask myself: What else does the \textit{espace vide} of the Galerie Iris Clert claim—empty space, yet filled as much as by the artist's breath of life as by the institutional atmosphere of the artworld? What else does it establish if not an economy and a biology of the belief that is \textit{at the same time} both modern and magic, neo-avant-gardist and archaic, in the immaterial, and eventually in art?

7. Incorporations & Inc.

Klein is categorical: It is the price that "serves to demonstrate that [the sensible immaterial quality] can be perceived in something other than material and physical appearance."\textsuperscript{52} Once the artwork has disappeared together with all its perceivable intrinsic qualities, the attestation of the aesthetic hold on the Thing and, thus, of the sensorial productivity of this manifestation-by-negation is finally a matter of a fiduciary and economic device. It is a matter of belief and of general exchange value.

He suggests, moreover, that this process functions structurally much like a Russian doll. There is the preliminary credit, or anticipated belief, that has been given and confirmed by the material institutions of the artworld: The exhibition devices and the frameworks of belief of the Iris Clert gallery, for example, in the sensibility of the artist as an appropriate aesthetic agent. And, in his turn, the artist—both internal and external spectator—is simultaneously subject and object of belief. Klein speaks expressly of \textit{croyance} and states that the initial act of faith is to believe to be able to respond to the mute interpellation made by the space and is the trust in his capacity to return the attention that the Thing has towards him, and finally to be able to go beyond, just with his conceptual gesture and just with his "presence in action" of his own artist-like manual work and skill, beyond every artwork and artifact, every depiction and representation.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, finally he will be able to realize the promise of transforming the Other who agrees to believe in an aesthetic relationship without beholding, but that is confirmed by the material institutions of the artworld, including its registration systems—for example, photographic indexicalization, administrative recording, and legalistic documentation.

It is a believing of believing or a belief in believing, and so forth, which is returned to the Other, to the public, in terms of experience beyond beholding, perhaps of aesthetic virtue or even of aesthetic implementation. The aesthetic act is a double act of belief and imagination, devoid of every image and property and yet solicited by the immateriality of the Thing to embody itself in significances and speech acts, to be realized in the knowledge and in a so-called experience of the Other, and is nothing other than a fiduciary imaginary in disguise, instructed by the institutions of the artworld.

Yet, there is not only the price of the Thing, but its empathetic and sensible encryption and bodily inscription by the Other. The act of believing is also a biological recording, or as Klein would have it, the general economy of being is universal cannibalism: Not only to buy the unreal, but to eat it, not only to socialize the immaterial but to incorporate it into oneself, in keeping with the Eucharistic act, "the center of gravity of carnal values in the sense of the true Christian faith."\textsuperscript{54} The beholder-purchaser, the passive internal subject of a "perception-assimilation directe et immédiate," is above all a body that incorporates the qualities of the Thing waiting to be realized, an organism that assumes without consuming its potential properties. It is flesh, which realizes the inchoative promises of the immaterial and transforms them into intrinsic and transmissible properties.\textsuperscript{55} On the external and contextual device, which prepares and logistically indexes the function of the Thing and documents it as a social object of exchange endowed with value, the internal assimilation of its substance is now superimposed, which regulates its transmission by metonymic contagion in existential and spiritual terms. To one belief another one is added. With

\textsuperscript{52} Y. Klein, "Conférence à la Sorbonne" (see note 3), p. 134.
\textsuperscript{53} Here one catches a glimpse of moderate realism in the sense described by R. Pouivet in \textit{Le Réalisme esthétique} (Paris: PUF, 2006), §VI.
\textsuperscript{55} Y. Klein and "Règles réelles" (see note 3), pp. 278–279.
seeing elided, there is now a relationship of circularity between believing and feeling.\(^{56}\)

Dematerialized and at the same time incorporated, the pictorial medium as such no longer has any optical value for Klein but a value of impregnation, environmental, and, I would say, tactile perception. Against painting as a “prison window” (Klein quotes Van Gogh), against the “tableau-form,” a formless breathed air, against the “optique apprise,” a lasting absorption, against the habit of seeing, a \textit{habitus} of feeling—as he writes in “Yves le monochrome 1960. Le vrai devient réalité, 1960”—of the “real universe hidden by the perceived universe.”\(^{57}\) Against the two-dimensional flatness and the impenetrability of the plane surface and Greenberg’s pictorial medium, an haptic education for the habitat and for the atmospheric, for the Thing, for the Real that belongs to no one. Against the frontality and verticality, an impregnation that detains, a living support in movement, a being record-keeper: The body of the beholder, who does not read and does not look from a fixed viewpoint but who is “viveur [de] comportements purs,” a dweller of pure external and at the same time internal space. Of the space of breath.\(^{58}\)

\section*{8. (Self-)portrait of the beholder as a fossil}

In 1959, Klein created the \textit{éponges-sculptures}, a few sponges soaked in blue or impregnated by the Thing, by “abstract sensible density but real, that [exists] and [lives]” by the place only apparently empty, like the

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\item[56.] In 1940, Clement Greenberg claimed that only two relationships are possible with abstract art: “by assimilating it and by fighting our way through it.” Indeed, by the negation of the medium in the purist abstraction of the postwar \textit{painted picture}, the painting is always as though suspended and promised, always still to come and possible, always only an object of imagination and never, writes Greenberg, an object of real aesthetic hold: “[I]t might—he said—just as well have been breathed on air or formed out of plasma. It tries to be something you imagine rather than see.” (See C. Greenberg, “Towards a Newer \textit{Laocoon}” (1940), in \textit{The Collected Essays and Criticism}, ed. J. O’Brian (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 29, 37). The painting that forgets the medium is also an object, I would say, of the fiduciary imagination instituted by belief in the artwork.
\item[58.] Klein quotes Bachelard and criticizes the “contre-espace,” or psychological time and spatialized past; see ibid., p. 121. But here one should discuss the semantics and the rhetoric of \textit{gegen-}, of the encounter, from Celan’s \textit{Gegenüber} to Beuys’s \textit{Gegenbild}.
\end{itemize}

Galerie Iris Clert, but in fact saturated with intentions and maneuverings, beliefs and utopias, significances and phantasms.\(^{59}\) Having ceded agency to the sensible experience passively undergone by the beholder without something to see, here the receptacle of the Thing, the body-vest of the Other, is static and immobile. Only having suppressed the phenomenality of the visible in favor of an objectless spatiality without perceptual selectivity nor any expressive link, the phenomenology of the senses is also lost: Having regressed to a form of elementary biological life, devoid of movement, action, and of function, dependent on visual and motor perceptions or involving sight, the living body of the beholder is no longer apriori responsible for the construction of meaning through an exploration of and experimentation with the world. Indeed, both objects and instruments, material and organism, “themselves beings of impregnation” (Remo Guidieri), these sponges-sculptures allegorize the \textit{viveurs}-beholders of the Thing; they are their avatars. But, are they biological testimonies, perhaps delegates and lieutenants of a hyperbolical and empathic absorption without beholding? Do they instruct us towards an ideal spectatorship with regard to the Thing, without images, representations, objects, artifacts, and artworks? Are these “floating sculptures” still linked to the base by the gravity in the space-Age\(^{60}\) and therefore the anachronistic reliquaries of a future of the ideal beholder, or a utopia that finishes by decreeing the death of the embodiment of meaning in general? Does Klein perhaps dramatize an archaeology or a future biology of art and of the beholder, which have both finally disappeared or have been reduced to prehuman remains and to nonhuman attitudes?

It is certain that these \textit{éponges-sculptures} shape us and end up showing our very selves as corporeal places, as living media of direct and immediate sensations, as carnal supports not only of sensorial affections but also of visceral emotions—and not only of sensations but also of feelings, of sentiments that are not necessarily linked to real perceptual situations of

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\item[59.] Haunted by the ghosts of art history too: For instance, one might argue that these sponges parody the exotic self-portrait by Matisse, who, in 1946, reminisced of himself in Polynesia “tout comme une éponge,” or that they have lost the technical and paratechnical function of the instrument still used by the hand of a Surrealist artist or an \textit{action painter}—that is, one still active and capable of creating images by chance, such as with a “Protogene sponge.”
\end{itemize}
the body but that may refer to a virtual embodied state and be empathetically simulated states as if they were experienced. They end up being embodiments—portraits of a static Zufühlung beneath our fields of seeing art through cultural, symbolic, institutional intermediaries; in a word, through our beliefs. They are, in short, an emblem of our practices and postures and exemplify the attitudes and aptitudes instructed by beliefs in art and in aesthetics or in the philosophy of art. Believing, as Dumézil said, is a “fossile morphologique,” and then, as de Certeau admonished, belief and credit cannot be described and defined by beginning from the different effects of valorization and qualification. Believing is set as a transcendental model, as an apriori, as condition of possibility of the aesthetic experiences of the Thing and of its pragmatic and contradictory variations, figures, and descriptions. Thus, these éponges-sculptures also epitomize the physiognomies of our forms of life in the artworld.

“Da ist keine Stelle, / die dich nicht sieht. Du mußt dein Leben ändern,” said Rilke in 1905, giving voice to the artwork, to an Archaic Torso of Apollo. The artwork approached a solitary beholder—it paid attention and addressed the poet: “There is no place on this stone / that does not see you. You must change your life.” Similarly, Klein’s sculptures-éponges focus on the beholder and have an analogous-looking function, only that, in their case, such a gaze directed towards the Other does not come from a fragment of a recognizable mimetic image or from an ordinary or artistic physical object. Attention comes from the Thing-atmosphere, which is aesthetically diffused and aesthetically nonlocalizable, and despite this, is a vital molder of history, action, and theory. The sculptures-éponges call us by a post-Duchampian “you” form, they regard us überhaupt and enjoin us to change our lives and our ways of experiencing art. Are they mineral skeletons of the immemorial, the mirror of ourselves, beyond individual and collective historical psychology of human beholding? Do they perhaps reflect the elementary life, the Other, which we are already—we, embodied representations and visions of the world, we, involved both with the fiduciary sensitiveness layers and practices of the world and the objects, and abstract beliefs of the artworld, we, invented by a fiction or an aesthetic/non-aesthesiological relationship with the Thing without authentic identification. We—What?

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